Policy-Discussion

[<Lambert.Hofstra AT ins.com>]

I already expected this. And having a software only solution will never
give you level 3.
I'm not saying CAcert should have Fips 140-2 level3 hardware, however.
using hardware like that supports enforced dual control. 

So, now we know there is no hardware support for elements like dual
control, we can still use the requirements for FIPS 140-2 level 3 to
verify the correctness and completeness of procedures and work
instructions (e.g. is it possible for a single individual to make a
change in the root key? => change procedure to fix this)

Lambert Hofstra  


> -----Original Message-----
> From: 
> cacert-policy-bounces AT lists.cacert.org
>  [mailto:cacert-policy-
> bounces AT lists.cacert.org]
>  On Behalf Of Kyle Hamilton
> Sent: 20 February 2006 12:52
> To: Policy-Discussion
> Subject: Re: [CAcert-Policy] [FIRSTREVIEW] Configuration Control
> Specification
> 
> At this point, everything relies upon OpenSSL, which has not yet
> released a FIPS-140-2 compliant module.  I believe the keys are stored
> encrypted on the drive, which has a physical access control as well as
> logical access control.
> 
> At this point, FIPS-140-2 certification has not been achieved by
> CAcert (to the best of my knowledge; if I am wrong, please correct
> me).  At such time as it is, if it is based on OpenSSL's FIPS code
> base, it will be (at best) level 1; if it relies on OpenSSL's ENGINE
> capability, it depends on the certification of the hardware used, and
> how it is used.  (In any case, the certification for the cryptographic
> module does not carry itself out to the entire implementation which
> uses the cryptographic module; the implementation must be certified
> independently of the module, though the use of a secure module makes
> things a lot quicker.)
> 
> -Kyle H
> 
> On 2/20/06, 
> Lambert.Hofstra AT ins.com
>  
> <Lambert.Hofstra AT ins.com>
>  wrote:
> > > This makes me wonder if it would be possible to have a key
generator
> > > somewhere that would split it into a 2/4 share scheme before ever
> > > letting it leave the box -- preferably one that would do all the
> > > encryption necessary to send via S/MIME to each of the employees,
as
> > > well as talking to the SMTP server to do so.
> > >
> > > Just musing...
> > >
> > > -Kyle H
> >
> > FIPS 140-2 requires for level 3 and 4 that keys can only be exported
in
> > such a way ("Secret and private keys established using manual
methods
> > shall be entered or output encrypted or with split knowledge
> > procedures.", see
> > http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf ;)
> >
> > Most devices support both n out of m, or n-components mechanisms.
> >
> > This makes me wonder: what is the security level of the
cryptographic
> > hardware in use at CAcert?
> >
> > Lambert Hofstra
> >
> >
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