Policy-Discussion

["Peter Williams" <home_pw AT msn.com>]

> From: 
> <Lambert.Hofstra AT ins.com>
> Reply-To: Policy-Discussion 
> <cacert-policy AT lists.cacert.org>
> To: 
> <cacert-policy AT lists.cacert.org>
> Subject: RE: [CAcert-Policy] [FIRSTREVIEW] Configuration Control 
> Specification
> Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2006 10:35:48 -0000
>
> > This makes me wonder if it would be possible to have a key generator
> > somewhere that would split it into a 2/4 share scheme before ever
> > letting it leave the box -- preferably one that would do all the
> > encryption necessary to send via S/MIME to each of the employees, as
> > well as talking to the SMTP server to do so.
> >
> > Just musing...
> >
> > -Kyle H
>
> FIPS 140-2 requires for level 3 and 4 that keys can only be exported in
> such a way ("Secret and private keys established using manual methods
> shall be entered or output encrypted or with split knowledge
> procedures.", see
> http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf ;)
>
> Most devices support both n out of m, or n-components mechanisms.
>
> This makes me wonder: what is the security level of the cryptographic
> hardware in use at CAcert?

Its hard to imagine the industry accepting an audit attestation that 
verifies that it is CAcert policy to use less than a FIPS 140-1 level 3 HSM 
to protect root keys.

Friendly note.

> Lambert Hofstra
>
>
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