Policy-Discussion

[Duane <duane AT cacert.org>]

Lambert.Hofstra AT ins.com
 wrote:

> I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you propose: you want to generate
> a new root cert, and have it signed by the current root cert? And thus
> use the HSM for an intermediate CA? That would indicate that you secure
> the intermediate level better than the root CA, and that does not sound
> correct.
>
>
> Or the other way around? Generate a new root cert. Use that to sign the
> current root cert, thereby demoting the existing CA to an intermediate
> CA, and asking everyone to import the new root cert?
> I guess this would work.

Either of these proposals would work I guess, I was suggesting the 
former, this way keys signed by the new sub-root would still be valid 
without importing another cert.

> There is of course the possibility to try and hack the existing root
> cert into the new HSM, but this is not common practice ( normally only
> possible with identical HSM's: export LMK in components, import LMK into
> new HSM, export keys encrypted under LMK and import the encrypted key
> into the new HSM.). The whole export/import might not be possible,
> depending on type of HSM (is it a PC card, or a standalone unit?). Also,
> you would need to have a very strict ceremony just to ensure the root
> cert will only be used to import it into the other CA (the HSM) and is
> immediately destroyed aftterwards. Tricky.  It would solve the root cert
> issue when you succeed, however, How do you guarantee that the root cert
> has not been copied in the process? That would effectively ruin the
> trustworthyness of the CAcert certificates...

No I wasn't suggesting putting the existing root cert on the HSM, there 
is a number of reasons we need to move away from the current root cert 
being the primary root, it uses MD5 hash, it's been used to sign 
client/server certs, and it wasn't generated in a secure way, ie it's 
accessible if the hardware is stolen and the attacker is determined enough.

--

Best regards,
 Duane

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