Policy-Discussion

["Peter Williams" <home_pw AT msn.com>]

> From: Philipp Gühring 
> <pg AT futureware.at>
> Reply-To: Policy-Discussion 
> <cacert-policy AT lists.cacert.org>
> To: Policy-Discussion 
> <cacert-policy AT lists.cacert.org>
> Subject: ***Spam*** Re: [CAcert-Policy] What is CAcert's mission?
> Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 22:29:17 +0100
>
>
> (Take a look at PKCS#11 for example, to see how bad non-quality controlled
> infrastructure can totally cannibalize the given standards)
>
> Best regards,
> Philipp Gühring


This is why I have such respect for Microsoft - not contempt, as many folks 
express. As an engineer, one can work in the Apple-style camp (good hardware 
made by yourself, OS made by you self, windows manager made by yourself, 
apps made by yourself, third party apps that you (used to) certify for 
quality), or the Windows camp (god knows what hardware crap is underneath, 
god know what drivers someone stuck above the HAL to customize the OS's use 
of hardware, only god know what apps are running on the OS whose install 
scripts changed the versions of the middleware libs, and noone knows how to 
test/fix such a thing except by using the "smell tests" built up over years 
of experience with the 80/20 rule.)

Addressing security in the 80/20 rule environment is a engineering 
challenge.

But at least we NOW have TPMs to rely upon, DONT WE- and, we NOW have TPMs 
that not only control the motherboard's processed programs to meet 
"integrity policy", not only do we also have virtualized TPMs built int the 
sever cores for controlling virtual machines' integrity mandates, TPM 
profiles can now ALSO control "offboard" storage/procesing on your 
USB/bussed devices such as memory sticks- the so-called "secure storage" 
concept.

Bye bye key escrow, welcome "'Secure' storage".

Bye bye GAK certs required to get a crypto key, welcome to TPM built into 
every "storage" device, enforcing "policy". Your policy? or theirs? is the 
interesting question.

What does that "policy" do, and who sets it? You, or "them"?

"Secure storage" - a euphamism, perhaps, for the _policy_ of key escrow - 
i.e. infrastucture faciltating _covert_ access to communications and data?