Subject: Policy-Discussion
List archive
- From: Iang <iang AT iang.org>
- To: Policy-Discussion <cacert-policy AT lists.cacert.org>
- Subject: Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate
- Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 15:50:09 +0100
- List-archive: <https://lists.cacert.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/cacert-policy>
- List-id: Policy-Discussion <cacert-policy.lists.cacert.org>
Lambert.Hofstra AT ins.com
wrote:
* Do we want increased traceability, with official prosecution inTraceability: I'd say yes, but would depend on what this entails.
mind? That is, a replacement/modification/extension of the ID copy
required till lately.
This is a key question that bedevilled the earlier debate. Yes, Traceability was wanted, but no, we didn't know what for.
The new Assurer Policy (wip) says something different (today). It suggests:
=================================
The Statement
The following claims can be made about a person who is assured:
1. The person is a bona fide CAcert User. In other words, the User is a member of the CAcert Community, as defined by the CAcert Community Agreement.
2. The User has a login account with CAcert's online registration and service system.
3. The User account can be determined from any certificate issued by the account.
4. *The User is bound into CAcert's Arbitration*.
5. Some personal details of the User (name, email, etc) are known.
The confidence level of the Statement is expressed by the Assurance Points.
=================================
The key part to look at is Claim 4, which says that CAcert's Arbitration rules. Now, this can bring the person before an Arbitrator. That Arbitrator can rule up to 100 Euros of fines, etc. The Arbitrator can also do other things, without particular limit, see below.
Official prosecution: not by CAcert, the only thing CAcert could do is
provide name, email address, and DOB of the person owning a certificate, and
only after a court order.
I would have said:
CAcert's Arbitrator can do things like provide a name, an email, DOB, and any other info that is permitted. If for example, the CAcert Arbitrator finds sufficient evidence of some wrong doing, the Arbitrator can strip the person's privacy.
The subtlety is that someone has to be able to do those things. Who can't do those things is CAcert, or the systems administrator or the support people, or the Assurer, because they are not authorised to do that.
(You may question whether the Arbitrator can reveal the names, etc without a court warrant. One general standard of behaviour is; if it is civil, probably not. If it is a crime, probably yes.)
Now to bring us back to traceability. In the above context, traceability might be an added benefit (maybe!) but the essence of traceability must still be seen in the forum of Arbitration.
Can we better bring this person before Arbitration? Does traceability help that?
I think we have to define what should be in the CSC: just a name or the
official name as written on the official ID (For Organisations the official
name of the organization), and maybe the email address (is it in there right
now? I noticed most CSC's do not include email address), probably name of the
application (to prevent others to sign malicious code with a stolen CSC),
anything else?
Windows shows Name of signer (Subject:CN?), Email address, Timestamp) as the digital signature details of a signed executable. I vote: Yes
Yes: Ted
If you followed the above argument (debateable still!) then you will see that there is another answer for what is needed in the CSC:
No PII at all needed.
As long as the CAcert Arbitrator can take the cert's unique number and identify the person, that's fine. All disputes find their way to the Arbitrator, in one way or another. See 3. above.
No:
* Do we want an additional agreement of the applicant? SomethingYes: Lambert, Ted
like she is no bad gal or that he knows that signing binaries
impose additional risks/obligations.
No:
I'm interested to hear your logic why? What would that agreement impose?
* Do we want additional education of the applicant, something likeHmm, I guess a simple test would do no harm (would show that CAcert is taking
the Assurer Challenge for code signers?
this serious, and that CSC's are only given to those that understand the
impact)
So: Yes
Yes:
No:
OK. Others?
iang
- [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Bernhard Fröhlich, 12/13/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Iang, 12/13/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Jac Kersing, 12/13/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Bernhard Froehlich, 12/14/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Philipp Gühring, 12/14/2007
- [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Bernhard Froehlich, 12/14/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Lambert.Hofstra, 12/16/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Bernhard Froehlich, 12/17/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Lambert.Hofstra, 12/17/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Iang, 12/17/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Lambert.Hofstra, 12/17/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Lambert.Hofstra, 12/16/2007
- [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Bernhard Froehlich, 12/14/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Iang, 12/17/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Lambert.Hofstra, 12/17/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Iang, 12/17/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Lambert.Hofstra, 12/17/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Policy about code signing certificate, Bernhard Froehlich, 12/18/2007
- [CAcert-Policy] Revocation, Philipp Gühring, 12/18/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Revocation, Lambert.Hofstra, 12/18/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Revocation, Teus Hagen, 12/18/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Revocation, Philipp Gühring, 12/18/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Philipp Gühring, 12/14/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Bernhard Froehlich, 12/14/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Jac Kersing, 12/13/2007
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] Proposal to stop issuing code signing certificates, Iang, 12/13/2007
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