Subject: Policy-Discussion
List archive
Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC
Chronological Thread
- From: "Greg Stark" <gstark AT electrorent.com>
- To: "'Policy-Discussion'" <cacert-policy AT lists.cacert.org>
- Subject: Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC
- Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2008 10:13:16 -0700
- List-archive: <https://lists.cacert.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/cacert-policy>
- List-id: Policy-Discussion <cacert-policy.lists.cacert.org>
Where does the vote stand? From:
cacert-policy-bounces AT lists.cacert.org
[mailto:cacert-policy-bounces AT lists.cacert.org] On Behalf Of Peter
Williams By the way, the verb confirmed is used as a subprocedure of
validation: checking the subscriber’s claim of a name, and the
right to use said , is ”confirmation” From what I recall, this had a basis in legal
“acknowledgement” protocols. Acknowledgements are specific types of
statements on which one may rely, with specifically limited legal semantics
well suited to that “pre-acceptance” phase of the certification
process. From: Peter Williams
[mailto:home_pw AT msn.com] The Mozilla CA
Certificate Policy uses wording like 'We consider verification of
certificate signing requests to be acceptable if it' This is acceptable (if you
are still ‘with’ the legal formalisms). A CSR is (self)signed. (a)
you are thus properly ”verifying”, since it’s a signature.
Second, in a semantic leap based on policy, a CSR is technically a prototype
cert (in a non X.509 format) in some CPSs. Thus, “sponsored”
by an LRA (assurer in CACert), and “subscribed to” by
the user, it gets “validated” by a/the relying party known as a CA.
During this act, there are validation procedures – such as EV. As a final
step the IA component of a CA registers the cert, turning it from
prototype/temp to accepted cert, at which point obligations are passed to
all types of relying party other than the CA and subscriber. Ahem. Yes, its legal bullshit. But,
writing it is highly paid… and its author (not me) made over $50M.
So… Remember, if like VeriSign ,
you are going to warrant now over 25 billion dollars, you need a strong
basis to convince the “insurers”. Since one cannot issue US-style
junk bonds to cover this kind of non-investment warranty, you have to go to
pure risk markets, like Lloyds. |
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, (continued)
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, IanG, 10/18/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Peter Williams, 10/19/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, IanG, 10/19/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Sam Johnston, 10/20/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Peter Williams, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, IanG, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Peter Williams, 10/21/2008
- [CAcert-Policy] EV stuff, IanG, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] EV stuff, Peter Williams, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Peter Williams, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Greg Stark, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Peter Williams, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, IanG, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Bernhard Fröhlich, 10/21/2008
- Re: [CAcert-Policy] CPS bugs. Vote please. Colosing date of votes21 October 12pm UTC, Greg Stark, 10/21/2008
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