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Re: Board inquisition of Multi-member escrow


Chronological Thread 
  • From: Daniel Black <daniel AT cacert.org>
  • To: cacert-policy AT lists.cacert.org
  • Subject: Re: Board inquisition of Multi-member escrow
  • Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 13:18:38 +1100
  • Authentication-results: lists.cacert.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.i= AT cacert.org; dkim-asp=none
  • Organization: CAcert

On Wednesday 24 March 2010 13:00:43 Mark Lipscombe wrote:
> On 3/24/2010 12:48 PM, Daniel Black wrote:
> > On Wednesday 24 March 2010 11:52:49 Mark Lipscombe wrote:
> Was any consideration given to how this contrasts with DRC C.3.e:
> 
> The root certificate private key pass-phrase (i.e. password) is not
> stored electronically or physically.

right. there is a strong difference of opinion with security policy:

SP9.2.2-c Passphrase must be strong and must be separately escrowed from 
media. 

> I suppose it might be argued that stored "parts" of the passphrase in
> several locations is not the same as the pass-phrase being "stored", but
> it seems like a stretch.

Everything to meet this criteria literally is a stretch. Even my approach 
with 
PKI protecting the root private key blob.

The frailty of memory isn't compatible with long term reliable storage. The 
simple things to remember can be defeated during brute force attack.

> I tried looking through the cacert-root archives, but couldn't find
> anything that answered this.

https://lists.cacert.org/wws/arc/cacert-root/2010-01/msg00015.html
https://lists.cacert.org/wws/arc/cacert-root/2010-01/msg00019.html


-- 
Daniel Black
CAcert

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