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DRC for audit - acceptability


Chronological Thread 
  • From: Daniel Black <daniel AT cacert.org>
  • To: "Policy-Discussion" <cacert-policy AT lists.cacert.org>
  • Subject: DRC for audit - acceptability
  • Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 16:54:57 +1100
  • Authentication-results: lists.cacert.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.i= AT cacert.org; dkim-asp=none
  • Organization: CAcert


It was decided long long ago to go for DRC with the audit.

It has been asked as to whether Mozilla will accept this[1].

Given Mozilla CA Certificate Policy (Version 1.2) #12 allows us to request a 
preliminary determination with regard to DRC policy[2] it seems prudent to do 
so.

Also questioned is the practicality of DRC like:
 C.3.e          The root certificate private key pass-phrase (i.e. password) 
 is not stored electronically or physically. [3][4]

Before we ask to the applicability of DRC lets look at the DRC that we cannot 
meet, why, an alternatives in the same spirit.

Please review and document on this list DRC that is hard/impractical to 
meet[5].

[1] https://lists.cacert.org/wws/arc/cacert-root/2010-01/msg00012.html
[2] http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/
[3] https://lists.cacert.org/wws/arc/cacert-root/2010-01/msg00015.html
[4] https://lists.cacert.org/wws/arc/cacert-policy/2010-03/msg00070.html
[5] http://audit.cacert.org/svn/DRC/browser.php


-- 
Daniel Black
CAcert

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