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Re: [Cacert-sysadm] svn.cacert.org uses a compromised ssl key


Chronological Thread 
  • From: Daniel Black <daniel AT cacert.org>
  • To: cacert-sysadm AT lists.cacert.org
  • Subject: Re: [Cacert-sysadm] svn.cacert.org uses a compromised ssl key
  • Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 19:34:45 +1000
  • List-archive: <http://lists.cacert.org/pipermail/cacert-sysadm>
  • List-id: CAcert System Admins discussion list <cacert-sysadm.lists.cacert.org>
  • Organization: CACert

>, why does it takes so long for the
> administrative site to revoke a certificate - where access to the actual
> machine is not even needed?

Though it has already been done I will ask why does it matter?

1 because confidential data can be intercepted? -  no it was public data 
anyway
2 because MITM could intercept data? well yes but basic passive encrypted 
traffic analysis will show what was downloaded anyway.
3 because MITM could modify data ? well yes however is it likely?

So now the occasional user is going to get a CRL/OCSP warning and then?
a) accept anyway
b) download from http instead
c) not download

So is someone going to go to the effort of 1a to
A) give you wrong information
B) put some content exploit on a document
Not likely!!

so apart from a bit of bad pr for cacert because of a lack of staffing and 
missing once minor system/certificate what is the impact?

Sorry for talking a wildly apathetic approach to poor protection of public 
data.

-- 
Daniel Black 
(daniel AT cacert.org)
Email Administrator

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