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Re: [Cacert-sysadm] svn.cacert.org uses a compromised ssl key


Chronological Thread 
  • From: Guillaume ROMAGNY <guillaume AT tiebogos.fr>
  • To: Daniel Black <daniel AT cacert.org>, CAcert System Administrators <cacert-sysadm AT lists.cacert.org>
  • Subject: Re: [Cacert-sysadm] svn.cacert.org uses a compromised ssl key
  • Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2008 12:03:02 +0200
  • List-archive: <http://lists.cacert.org/pipermail/cacert-sysadm>
  • List-id: CAcert System Admins discussion list <cacert-sysadm.lists.cacert.org>
  • Openpgp: id=EB42B796
  • Organization: Springfield Nuclear Power Plant HeadQuarters

Hi Daniel,

Daniel Black a écrit :
, why does it takes so long for the
administrative site to revoke a certificate - where access to the actual
machine is not even needed?

Though it has already been done I will ask why does it matter?


Apparently not, and now I have a fatal message from Firefox3 I bet the ocsp is working.

1 because confidential data can be intercepted? - no it was public data anyway
2 because MITM could intercept data? well yes but basic passive encrypted traffic analysis will show what was downloaded anyway.
3 because MITM could modify data ? well yes however is it likely?

So now the occasional user is going to get a CRL/OCSP warning and then?
a) accept anyway
b) download from http instead
c) not download


Impossible to bypass with FF3 AFAI see

--
Cordialement, Best regards,

Guillaume
Tiebogos (by L'Oreal), parce que je le 'veau' bien.

Vision without action is a daydream. Action without vision is a
nightmare.  -- Japanese Proverb

Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature




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