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Re: two possible MD5 hashed certificates in a chain


Chronological Thread 
  • From: Ian G <iang AT cacert.org>
  • To: dieter.hennig AT id.ethz.ch
  • Cc: "cacert-sysadm AT lists.cacert.org" <cacert-sysadm AT lists.cacert.org>, Philipp Guehring <philipp AT cacert.org>, Daniel Black <daniel AT cacert.org>, Mario Lipinski <mario AT cacert.org>
  • Subject: Re: two possible MD5 hashed certificates in a chain
  • Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 16:50:58 +0100
  • Authentication-results: lists.cacert.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.i= AT cacert.org; dkim-asp=none

Hi Deiter

It feels like we are getting closer to a solution, but I want to be careful we are not just following a chimera here.


On 13/01/2010 15:44, Dieter Hennig wrote:
Hi,


schrieb Ian G, Am 13.01.2010 14:38:
On 13/01/2010 11:34, Philipp Guehring wrote:
Hi,

Is this good/better/bad/ugly and why?

I am using class3 certs. So just turning class 3 off just because of a
senseless desire of some people is not an option imho.

My suggestion is that we add some warning messages to the web-interface,
that tells the users about the problems with the class3 certificate and
discourages them to use it, (and to automatically use class1 instead of
class3) but to still allow class3 for those users that still need it.

Is this acceptable for everyone?


It sounds good to me.  Indeed, it is a perceptional response to a
perceptional issue, or to put it in americanisms, it is a low hanging
fruit.


Let us try that, maybe in the second step we following more Daniels idea
to take *this* class3 away (but not to revoke it), if we see, that this
is possible.


Just to be absolutely clear: Are you agreed that switching the default around from Class 3 to Class 1 solves your problem?

That's what Philipp proposed.

(Daniel's proposal -- dropping the Class 3 -- is an entirely more aggressive step. See below.)


However, I am waiting to see if the users concerned (the two
universities) are really prepared to use the Class 1.


a.) We (ETH) are distributing only the Class-1 certificate to our
managed desktop systems and would suggest the students to install that
on private notebooks too. The same will be done by the UZH. This is a
time consuming process of several months.

b.) The  (new?) Class-3-certificate we would use like an airbag and send
it as an *intermediate* certificate by the html-servers. Today our
servers-administrators know how to use that. Here we can react fast.


So the system administrators are in charge of the Class-3 question. And you can react quickly here.

So if there is a need to instruct those sysadms to not use the Class 3, then you can do that? Already?


Just in the moment, we (the so called "registration authority" is
getting CSR from the known admins) are signing only with the Class-1, as
Daniel suggested too.


What advantage does dropping the Class 3 from CAcert's entire community then offer you that you don't already have?


iang

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