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cacert - Re: [CA cert] DKIM and X509 certificates

Subject: A better approach to security

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  • From: Daniel Black <daniel AT cacert.org>
  • To: A better approach to security <cacert AT lists.cacert.org>
  • Subject: Re: [CA cert] DKIM and X509 certificates
  • Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2009 00:01:27 +1100

On Mon, 5 Jan 2009 09:02:39 pm Alejandro Mery Pellegrini wrote:
> Daniel Black wrote:
> > Another use for certificates,
> >
> > http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2008q4/010830.html
> >
> > feel free to contact the author with any comments. there are quite a few
> > in the thread too.
>
> I haven't tried dkim yet, but it seems a much more decent approach

it's a nice signature algorithm in a well designed verification method. The
only shame is that mail lists like adding things like [CA cert] and hence
breaking signatures.

> than the evil SPF.

bit of an overstatement. Its simple path verification that suffers the from
the disadvantages that:
1. good spammers can forge it and
2. mail blind copy forwarding, which is a kind of spoofing, can cause issues.

if you worked the two together nicely you'd have it well
dkim - content checking works with blind forwarding that is broken by email
lists
spf - passes email lists and breaks on blind forwarding

unfortunately its hard to deploy both checking in a A or B manner. Standards
like http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kucherawy-sender-auth-header-19 will
enable email validation to be independ of policy determinations that should
make things better eventuall.

Personally I think DKIM is fine without X509 but everyone has to make a
standard at some time to scratch their own itch.

--
Daniel Black (daniel AT cacert.org)
Email Administrator

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